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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The empirical literature on corruption has used data on corruption from three 
different sources: (i) investigative reports, (ii) newspapers, and (iii) surveys or 
questionnaire-based data. Some studies on corruption are based on case studies and 
newspaper reports. Studies by Wedeman (1997); Wade (1982) and Alam (1996) fall 
in this category. While these studies have presented an in-depth analysis of 
corruption, they do not examine a large sample of countries. Moreover, the 
investigative reports require detective work and sometimes connections with people 
in high echelons in order to expose corruption. Unlike investigative reports, access to 
survey data on corruption enables researchers to study corruption for a large sample 
of countries, but at the same time, raises questions about their subjectivity.1 
However, the subjectivity of these indices is often justified on the ground that 
corruption is illegal in nature, and hard to measure directly.  
Empirical studies on the causes of corruption after the mid-1990s have used 
several corruption indices from Business International, International Country Risk 
Guide, Peter Neumann and his collaborators at Impulse, Transparency International, 
and World Competitiveness Report. More than one corruption index has been used in 
most of these empirical studies. For example, Ades and Di Tella (1997) used 
corruption indices from WCR and Peter Neumann and his collaborators at Impulse 
(1994). Treisman (2000) recently utilised four corruption indices: three from 
Transparency International (1996 to 1998) and one from Business International.  
While empirical literature on the causes of corruption using these indices continues 
to surge, it is imperative carefully to examine what exactly these indices portray.  
I have selected four sources: (i) World Competitiveness Report WCR (1990, 
1992, 1994, 1996), (ii) Transparency International TI (1995 to 1998), (iii) International 
 
Naved Ahmad is Assistant Professor of Economics, at the Institute of Business Administration, 
University of Karachi, Karachi.  
Author’s Acknowledgements:  I am thankful to Prof. M. Shahid Alam, Prof. John Adams, and 
Prof. Alan Dyer for their helpful suggestions. I bear the sole responsibility for any remaining errors. 
1See Fisman and Gatti (1999); Husted (1999); Mauro (1995); Rijckeghem and Weder (1997); 
Tanzi (1998) and  Tanzi and Davoodi (1997). 
Naved Ahmad 814
Country Risk Guide ICRG (1982 to 1995), and (iv) the World Bank WB (1996) data 
to examine this issue. The following section presents various sources of corruption 
indices. The analysis will be performed in two phases. In Section 2, I present a 
comparative analysis based on rank correlation across various sources and over time. 
To strengthen my analysis, Section 3 presents a regression analysis to show whether 
these indices produce similar results for a common set of countries. There are only 
20 countries for which the data are available from these sources. I run regressions on 
a common set of independent variables encompassing variables from winners’ and 
losers’ side. The main purpose of these regressions is carefully to examine the 
relationship between the corruption indices and all the independent variables. This 
empirical exercise will help determine the association between the corruption indices 
and the independent variables. The final section concludes. 
 
2.  SOURCES OF CORRUPTION INDICES 
The data on corruption and other risk factors are now available for a large 
number of countries. These indices are sold to banks, multinational companies and 
international investors. The first set of data comes from Business International (BI), 
now incorporated into The Economist Intelligence Unit. The survey asks about “the 
degree to which business transactions involve corruption or questionable payment”. 
The assessment reports are completed by the staff members of Business International 
working in the survey countries. The replies are examined at Business International’s 
regional and corporate headquarters. The survey covers 68 countries for 1980–1983 
period (one observation per country for the entire period). The index ranges from 0 
(corrupt) to 10 (clean). 
The second set of corruption data comes from World Competitiveness Report 
(WCR), which is published by the Institute for Management Development. The 
report compares and ranks countries on 224 criteria under 8 categories. These eight 
categories are domestic economy, internationalisation, government, finance, 
infrastructure, management, science and technology, and people. In this survey, one 
of the questions asks top and middle management about the prevalence improper 
practices, such as bribery or corruption in the public sphere. The exact question 
about corruption varies slightly from year to year. In 1989, the question involves “the 
extent to which the country prevents corruption”.  In 1990, the question dealt with 
“the extent to which government regulations prevent improper practices in the public 
sphere” and in 1991, and 1992, the question addressed “the extent to which improper 
practices such as bribing and corruption do not prevail in the public sphere”.  
The index ranges from 0 (corrupt) to 10 (clean). For the four years, 1993–
96, the survey included 37, 45, 48, and 46 countries, respectively. One advantage 
of the WCR data over the BI data is that the WCR data contain responses of people 
who have intimate knowledge of the business practices in each of the surveyed 
countries.  
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In a similar fashion, in 1997, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
(PERC) in Hong Kong surveyed 280 expatriate business executives in 12 Asian 
countries, asking “to what extent does corruption exist in the country in which you 
are posted in a way that detracts from the business environment for foreign 
companies?” The index ranges from 1, which represents a situation in which 
corruption does not exist, to 10 which represents a completely corrupt environment.  
Unlike the BI and WCR, the indices constructed by DRI/McGraw-Hill Global 
Risk Service and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) were based on 
assessments made by their staff members after an in-depth country analysis and 
discussion, although this method is somewhat less transparent to outsiders. The 
DRI/McGraw Hill Global Risk Service covers 105 countries for 1995. Unlike the BI 
index, the ICRG index is prepared annually. It covers 1982 to 1995 and, depending 
on the year is available for 88 to 129 countries.  
The most interesting contribution to the corruption index is the Gallup 
International Survey for 1997. On average, 800 individuals from the general 
population are interviewed in 44 countries, either in person or on the telephone. 
Question 5 of the “global” portion of the questionnaire is as follows: “From the 
following groups of people, can you tell me for each of them, if there are a lot of 
cases of corruption, many cases of corruption, few cases, or no cases of corruption at 
all. The groups listed afterwards were “politicians,” “trade unionists,” “public 
officials,” “policemen,” “businessmen,” “judges,” “ordinary citizens,” 
“clergy/priests,” and “journalists.” For each country the replies to the 5 categories 
(“a lot,” “many,” “few,” “none” and “no answer”) were aggregated, yielding data by 
categories.  
Similar to the Gallup International data, Göttingen University conducted a 
survey via the Internet to generate a corruption perception index (Internet Corruption 
Perception Index). Between January and June 1997, Internet users with interest in the 
topic of corruption were asked to complete an interactive questionnaire. There were 
246 responses to the questionnaire. Internet users were asked the following question: 
“You enter a public office which is authorised to grant licenses and permits (e.g. the 
license to conduct business).  After you have waited for a long time you are expected 
to pay a bribe and are told that otherwise you will not receive the license.  According 
to your perception, in which countries may this (i.e. the asking for bribes by public 
officials) happen? On the other hand, where do you consider it to be unlikely?” 
Three choices, “often,” “sometimes,” and “rarely,” were listed at the end of the 
question.  
The indices discussed are based on the perception of heterogeneous 
respondents with different nationalities. Peter Neumann and his collaborators at 
Impulse, a German business firm, conducted a survey in 1994 in which only German 
businessmen (exporters) were interviewed who were normally involved in the trade 
with each of the countries. They were asked to indicate the number of deals that 
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involve corrupt payments and the estimate of kickback per deal as a percentage of 
the deal value. One hundred and three countries were included in the survey. These 
indices are less subjective because of the nature of the questions asked. Each 
respondent had to give an estimate of the kickback per deal. Moreover, the 
respondents were taken from a homogeneous group of people (German exporters) 
with practical business experience in each country. 
Transparency International and Göttingen University combined several 
corruption indices to produce a composite index of corruption. This index is 
available for 1995 to 1998. In 1997, an index (TI-Corruption Index) was compiled 
for 52 countries from 7 sources. The seven sources were two surveys from the 
Institute for Management Development in Lausanne, Switzerland (World 
Competitiveness Report), one from the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
Ltd. in Hong Kong (Asian Intelligence Issue No. 482), one by Gallup International, 
two assessments by DRI/McGraw-Hill (Global Risk Service) and the Political Risk 
Services, East Syracuse, New York (International Country Risk Guide), and a survey 
conducted at Göttingen University via the Internet (Internet Corruption Perception 
Index). From Gallup International survey only 4 groups “politicians,” “public 
officials,” “policemen” and “judges,” were used in this index because the other 
groups mentioned in the Gallup International survey do not fit the definition of 
corruption as the misuse of public power for private benefits. The index is a “poll of 
polls”. Recently Transparency International has released corruption rankings for 90 
countries for the year 2000.   
There are four statistics given for each country. The first is its position in 
the TI-index. The second figure is the overall integrity ranking (out of 10).  Ten 
stands for a highly clean country, while zero is for a country where business 
transactions are entirely dominated by kickbacks, extortion, and bribery. No 
country scored a ten or a zero. The third figure indicates the number of surveys in 
which the particular country has been included (from 4 to 7). The fourth figure 
indicates the variance of the different sources. The minimum number of surveys in 
which a particular country is included was reduced from 4 to 3 in 1998.  The 1997 
index has an average variance that is almost one third lower than in 1996, making 
it far more reliable. A higher variance indicates a higher degree of deviating 
opinions, with some respondents placing the country much higher and others much 
lower on the overall scale.  
All the sources of corruption indices discussed above focus on perceptions of 
foreign firms only. These indices represent either the perception of staff members 
(external viewpoint) or the perception of people working in organisations located in 
those countries (internal viewpoint). Unlike these sources, the World Bank 
conducted a worldwide survey of the private sector. The survey questionnaire 
measured the uncertainty of government policies. Section three of the questionnaire 
asks the degree to which corruption is problematic for doing business. The survey 
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dealt with both domestic and foreign business firms. The indices are available for 67 
countries for 1996 and range from 1 to 6.  
Several important characteristics of the World Bank data on corruption make 
these indices very useful. First, unlike all other corruption indices, the World Bank 
data include the perception of people who work in domestic firms i.e., firms with no 
foreign participation. Second, the data are also available for specific departments 
such as the police, customs, and the judiciary. Third, this data set provides measures 
of corruption from several perspectives. For example one question asks respondents 
to rate how corruption is problematic in doing business. The other question asks 
respondents to rate on a scale of 1 to 6 whether these businesses accept bribes. Still 
another question asks about the pervasiveness of bribery.  
In the following section, I will present correlation coefficients among the 
corruption indices discussed in this section. 
 
3. CORRUPTION INDICES AND RANK CORRELATION 
A few recent survey studies on corruption have documented various sources 
of corruption indices. The explanation of these corruption indices has already been 
discussed in Section 2. Nevertheless, I will briefly mention the types of corruption 
reflected by these indices.  Virtually all sources define corruption as an abuse of 
public office for private benefit. These indices reflect the behaviour of public 
officials and politicians. While these indices theoretically define corruption in a same 
fashion, they do not guarantee that the rankings they generate are consistent. This 
section investigates whether these rankings produce consistent results and whether 
they are consistent over time. 
The rank correlation coefficients are given in Table 1. The correlation 
coefficients between ICRG95 and WCR96 (0.80) and between WCR96 and WB96 
(0.82) are higher than the correlation between ICRG95 and WB96 (0.56). The high 
correlation  between  WCR96  and  ICRG95  may be due to the fact that both indices 
 
 Table 1 
Rank Correlation: 
(WCR96, ICRG95, TI96, WB96) 
  WCR96 ICRG95 TI96 WB96 
WCR96 1.000    
ICRG95 .8035(44) 1.000   
TI96 .9644(43) .8739(53) 1.000  
WB96 .8224(22) .5612(47) .8385(29) 1.000 
 Note:  Figures in parenthesis are the number of observations.  
          WCR = World Competitiveness Report, ICRG = International Country Risk Guide,  
          TI = Transparency International, and WB = World Bank.  
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focused on firms or businesses engaged in foreign activities. On the other hand, the 
correlation between WCR96 and WB96 is higher because these indices represent the 
internal viewpoint about corruption. In contrast, the correlation coefficient between 
WB96 and ICRG95 is only 0.56. One plausible reason for this low correlation is that 
the ICRG95 corruption indices include foreign firms with external viewpoints about 
corruption, whereas WB96 corruption indices represent internal viewpoints with 
concentration in local business firms.  
Although the above indices evidence a close association among themselves, 
the question is whether they rank countries consistently over time. To ascertain this, 
rank correlation coefficients of the various corruption indices from the same sources, 
but for the different time periods have been calculated. The rank correlation for 
ICRG, WCR, and TI corruption indices are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 
respectively.  
The indices are highly correlated between any two consecutive surveys.  It is 
evident from these tables that the value of correlation coefficient decreases as the 
time span between the two indices expands. Notice that the minimum value of 
correlation coefficient in Tables 2, 3 and 4 is 0.68 [ICRG (1982) and ICRG (1995)], 
which is high. This demonstrates that the corruption rankings are persistent over 
time.  
 
 
Table 2 
Rank Correlation: 
(World Competitiveness Report 1990, 1992,1994, 1996) 
 WCR90 WCR92 WCR94 WCR96 
WCR90 1.000    
WCR92 .9378(34) 1.000   
WCR94 .9093(34) .9514(36) 1.000  
WCR96 .8892(33) .9482(35) .9386(43) 1.000 
   Figures in parenthesis are number of observations. 
 
Table 3 
Rank Correlation: 
(Transparency International 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998) 
 TI95 TI96 TI97 TI98 
TI95 1.000    
TI96 .9784(40) 1.000   
TI97 .9274(41) .9594(47) 1.000  
TI98 .9478(41) .9559(53) .9813(52) 1.000
                         Figures in parenthesis are number of observations.  
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Table 4 
Rank Correlation: 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 1982–1995 
 Icrg82 Icrg83 Icrg84 Icrg85 Icrg86 Icrg87 Icrg88 
Icrg82 1.000       
Icrg83 .9819(88) 1.000      
Icrg84 .9179(88) .9624(90) 1.000     
Icrg85 .8748(88) .9131(90) .9579(111) 1.000    
Icrg86 .8713(88) .9124(90) .9545(111) .9959(129) 1.000   
Icrg87 .8582(88) .8988(90) .9420(111) .9871(129) .99(129) 1.000  
Icrg88 .8336(88) 8707(90) .9208(111) .9724(129) .9715(129) .9829(129) 1.000 
Icrg89 .7837(88) 8194(90) .8730(111) .9370(129) .9357(129) .9464(129) .9660(129) 
Icrg90 .7824(88) .8143(90) .8488(111) .9132(129) .9116(129) .9211(129) .9391(129) 
Icrg91 .7877(88) .8135(90) .8430(111) .8866(128) .8850(128) .8922(128) .9089(129) 
Icrg92 .7602(88) .7805(90) .8060(111) .8020(128) .7994(128) .8048(128) .8229(128) 
Icrg93 .7149(88) .7415(90) .7734(111) .7448(128) .7437(128) .7473(128) .7643(128) 
Icrg94 .7162(88) .7435(90) .7752(111) .7446(128) .7432(128) .7465(128) .7643(128) 
Icrg95 .6899(88) .7165(90) .7418(111) .7113(128) .7063(128) .7138(128) .7315(128) 
 Icrg89 Icrg90 Icrg91 Icrg92 Icrg93 Icrg94 Icrg95 
Icrg89 1.000       
Icrg90 .9789(129) 1.000      
Icrg91 .9442(128) .9672(129) 1.000     
Icrg92 .8294(128) .8499(129) .9082(129) 1.000    
Icrg93 .7619(!28) .7759(129) .8358(129) .9358(129) 1.000   
Icrg94 .7570(128) .7719(129) .8339(129) .9317(129) .9968(130) 1.000  
Icrg95 .7142(128) .7304(129) .7940(129) .8883(129) .9621(130) .9763(130) 1.000 
Figures in parenthesis are the number of observations.  
 
These rank correlation coefficients produce very close estimates of how these 
corruption rankings are correlated over time. Furthermore, I categorised countries 
into three groups: namely clean (0-2), partly corrupt (2–7), and corrupt (7-10)2. 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the changes in corruption rankings for WCR (1994 to 
1996), TI (1997–1998), and ICRG (1982 to 1995) respectively. Table 5 reveals that 
only 8 countries out of 43 have succeeded in moving from one category to another. 
The results are mixed when the changes within groups were considered. Fifteen 
countries increased their rankings, whereas rankings of fourteen countries have gone 
down. Six countries did not change rankings. Most of the countries whose rankings 
had increased or decreased were European countries.  It is evident from Table 5 that 
very few countries have succeeded in moving from one category to another.  As far 
as increase (or decrease) in corruption rankings within categories is concerned, the 
results are mixed. 
 
2The list of countries and their categorisation are presented in Appendix A.  
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Table 5 
Changes in Corruption Rankings (WCR: 1994, 1996) 
Changes 1994 to 1996 
(One Category to Another) 
 Improve Decrease Total 
Africa/Middle East    
Asia/Pacific Region 1  1 
Europe 4 2 6 
Latin America/Caribbean    
North America  1 1 
Total 5 3 8 
 
(Within Categories) 
 Improve Decrease Unchanged Total 
Africa/Middle East   1 1 
Asia/Pacific Region 6 5 1 12 
Europe 8 6 2 16 
Latin America/Caribbean 1 2 1 4 
North America  1 1 2 
Total 15 14 6 35 
 
Table 6 
Changes in Corruption Rankings (TI: 1997-1998) 
Changes 1997 to 1998 
(One Category to Another) 
   Improve Decrease Total 
Africa/Middle East    
Asia/Pacific Region 1  1 
Europe  1 1 
Latin America/Caribbean 1  1 
North America 1  1 
Total 3 1 4 
 
(Within Categories) 
 Improve Decrease Unchanged Total 
Africa/Middle East 1  1 2 
Asia/Pacific Region 8 6  14 
Europe 3 11 8 22 
Latin America/Caribbean 4 2 2 8 
North America   2 2 
Total 16 19 13 48 
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Table 7 
Changes in Corruption Rankings (ICRG: 1982–1995) 
Changes 1982 to 1995 
(One Category to Another) 
 
Africa/
Middle 
Asia/ 
Pacific Europe NA LA/CAR Total 
Unchanged       
Clean  1 7 14 2 1 25 
Less Corrupt 7 2 1 1 11 22 
Corrupt 2     2 
Less corrupt to clean to less corrupt 1  1  1 3 
Less corrupt to corrupt to less 
corrupt     1 1 
Sub-total 11 9 16 3 14 53 
Improvement       
Less corrupt to clean 2 1 3  1 7 
Corrupt to less corrupt 4 5   3 12 
Corrupt to clean 1     1 
Corrupt to clean to less corrupt 1     1 
Corrupt to less corrupt to clean 4     4 
Less corrupt to corrupt to less 
corrupt to clean 1     1 
Corrupt to less corrupt to clean to 
less corrupt 1     1 
Sub-total 14 6 3  4 27 
Decrease       
Clean to less corrupt 1 1   3 5 
Less corrupt to corrupt 2     2 
Sub-total 3 1   3 7 
Total 28 16 19 3 21 87 
 
I observed similar results in changes in corruption rankings using 
Transparency International indices between 1997 and 1998. Four countries out of 52 
were successful in changing their categories. Sixteen countries increased their 
rankings, whereas rankings of nineteen countries have gone down. Thirteen countries 
did not change rankings. The data in Table 6 indicate that many countries do change 
their rankings within categories. This may be because corruption rankings might be 
affected with certain sudden changes in government policies. These changes do not 
cause the public to overlook government corruption altogether, but they do have 
some impact on corruption rankings. 
The above analysis revealed that few countries have managed to move from 
one category to another, suggesting the entrenched nature of corruption. To 
determine whether corruption exerts a persistent nature over a longer period of time I 
have, using corruption indices from ICRG, categorised countries into three groups: 
(1) clean (0–2), (2) partly corrupt (2–7), and (3) corrupt (7–10).   
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Of the 87 countries for which data are available for 1982 to 1995, 53 countries 
remain corrupt (partly corrupt or clean), suggesting persistency in corruption 
rankings. For a corrupt country, it is difficult to change people’s perception about 
corruption because it takes time for the government to make people believe that they 
are sincere in their efforts to mitigate corruption. In other words, perceptions about 
corruption exhibit a self-generating property. As Tirole (1996) and Tanzi (1994) 
argue, corruption is likely to be found in countries where corruption existed for some 
time as compare to countries where corruption is relatively new.    
Table 7 confirms that perceptions about corruption do not change quickly. It 
shows that only three European countries improved their ranking from one category 
to another between 1982 to 1995. Similarly, out of 21 Latin American countries, 
only 3 have achieved improvements from one category to another.  
 
4. CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDICES:  
A REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Although the above analysis suggests that these corruption indices are highly 
correlated and stable over time, investigators continued using at least two indices to 
support their hypotheses. To widen my analysis, I have run regressions on the same set of 
independent variables using several corruption indices for a common set of countries.  
A corrupt transaction always creates winners and, almost, always losers. The 
current empirical literature on causes of corruption has, however, failed to analyse 
corruption from winners’ and losers’ perspectives. In this analysis, I have included 
factors from winners’ and losers’ point of view.  
From winners’ side, I have included two factors that generate rent, i.e., the size 
of the government, and an index of regulations. The share of government consumption 
in GDP measures government size. It can be intuitively argued that large governments 
create large bureaucracies, which, in turn, provides more opportunities for graft. I 
expect a positive relationship between government size and corruption. Husted (1999) 
has used this measure as a determinant of corruption. The index of government 
regulation measures the extent of regulations imposed by government regarding 
business operations, price controls, foreign trade (exports and imports), labour 
regulations, foreign currency regulations, tax regulations, and safety and environmental 
regulations. This index is a sum of seven indices. These seven indices are (i) 
regulations for starting business and new operations, (ii) price controls, (iii) regulations 
on foreign trade, (iv) labour regulations, (v) foreign currency regulations, (vi) tax 
regulations and/or high taxes, and (vii) safety or environmental regulations. I expect a 
positive relationship between the composite index of regulations and corruption. 
From the losers’ side, I have included an index of bureaucratic competition, 
newspaper circulation (level of information), urbanisation, average years of schooling, 
index of political liberty.3  All these variables enhance the ability of losers to take 
 
3 See Alam (1995).  
Corruption Perception Indices 823
countervailing actions against corrupt officials. The index of bureaucratic competition 
measures the extent to which people can obtain fair treatment by avoiding corrupt 
officials.  Level of information is another factor that helps people take countervailing 
actions. The print media keep people well-informed about public officials who are 
misusing their powers. I have used newspaper circulation per 1000 persons as a 
measure of the level of information. Urbanisation deters corruption. People living in 
urban areas can raise their voice against corruption through the platform of various 
organisations such as association of producers, traders, importers, and consumers. 
These associations will increase the effectiveness of direct countervailing actions.4  
Urbanisation is defined as the share of urban population in the total population. I 
expect a negative relationship between urbanisation and corruption. Educational level 
is likely to enhance the awareness of the people about their rights and increase their 
ability to fight against their losses from corruption. Average years of schooling at age 
15 and above in the total population measures the level of education. Finally, 
democracy can also increase the effectiveness of countervailing actions.  An index of 
political rights is used as a measure of democracy. In democratic societies, the weak 
bargaining power of public officials because of decentralised political power may 
enable losers to resist corrupt officials with ease.  
The dependent variable, corruption index, is taken from various sources. I 
have included three indices from Transparency International (1996 to 1998), one 
from the International Country Risk Guide (1995), one from the World 
Competitiveness Reports (1996), and one from the World Bank (1996). These 
indices cover a wide range of perceptions of corruption, including internal and 
external viewpoints and domestic and foreign firms’ perspectives. Ordinary least 
square technique is used to estimate the coefficients of independent variables. Table 
8 presents the regression results. 
An examination of the regression results leads to several convincing 
arguments. First, in all regressions, these independent variables explain more than 50 
percent of variations in corruption. Second, with one exception, the relationship 
between the independent variables and the corruption index is consistent across all 
sources. The coefficient for newspaper circulation is positive only in the case of 
ICRG (1995).  Third,  the  coefficient  of  the measure of government regulations has  
 
4The discussant, Mr Daniyal Aziz, argued during the general discussion that urbanisation fosters 
conditions that are conducive to corruption. The same argument was put forward by Meier and Holbrook 
(1992) who argue that in an urban environment, family and religion lose their social control, which, in 
turn, reduces the ability of losers to take countervailing actions against corruption. The investigators 
measured corruption as the number of public officials convicted of corruption charges. The problem with 
this measure is that it may be a proxy for the effectiveness of the reporting system and cannot take care of 
those corrupt activities that are not reported, as discussed in Knack and Keefer (1995). It is likely that 
urbanisation has provided more opportunity to uncover corruption charges as compared to rural areas, and 
therefore it is unclear whether urbanisation induces public officials to become involved in corruption or if 
it helps to uncover already corrupt officials.  
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Table 8 
Regression Results: WB96, TI98, TI97, TI96, WCR96, and ICRG95 
Independent Variables WB96 TI98 TI97 TI96 WCR96 ICRG95 
Regulations 1.66*** 1.05*** 0.92*** 0.68* 1.09** 0.57** 
Bureaucratic Competition –0.38** –0.60** –0.56** –0.55* –0.65* –0.53** 
Average Years of Schooling –0.044 –0.098 –0.083 –0.18 –0.11 –0.16 
Government Consumption –0.063 –0.15** –0.13** –0.17** –0.21** –0.08** 
Urbanisation 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.027 0.012 0.018 
Political Liberty –0.34 –0.57** –0.74*** –0.32 –0.39 –0.47** 
Newspaper Circulation –0.003* –0.001 –0.001 –0.003 –0.002 0.0009 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.74 0.76 0.65 0.60 0.56 
Number of Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 
*10 percent level of significance. 
** 5 percent level of significance. 
*** 1 percent level of significance. 
Results are adjusted for heteroscadasticity. 
The 20 countries are Austria, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K, U.S.A, USSR, and Venezuela. 
 
expected positive sign in all cases.  Finally, bureaucratic competition, the average 
years of schooling, and an index of political liberty have the expected negative signs 
in all cases, whereas the coefficients of urbanisation and government size have 
wrong signs in all cases. 
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An attempt has been made to examine various corruption indices that are used 
in current empirical literature, especially with regard to the causes of corruption.  
The primary purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that these corruption indices 
not only produce similar results, but that the results are consistent over time. I 
approach this task by first presenting rank correlation coefficients among these 
indices and then categorising countries into three groups to analyse their rankings 
over time. Finally, I regress these indices on the same set of independent variables 
for a common set of countries. The results reveal that these indices are correlated 
among each other and are stable over time. In addition to the rank correlation, the 
regression results confirm that these indices yield similar results. Thus, using any 
one of these sources would be sufficient for the determination of the causes of 
corruption. However, the regression results must be considered with caution because 
these results may be influenced by the small sample size. Nonetheless, this analysis 
has shed some light on the consistency of the corruption indices across various 
sources and over time.  
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REPORT (WCR) 1990 
Clean: 
Singapore, Denmark, New Zealand, Netherlands, United Kingdom.  
Partly Corrupt: 
Hong Kong, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Canada, Norway, Ireland, 
Australia, United States, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Japan, Austria, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, Portugal, Turkey, Mexico, Spain, Thailand. 
Corrupt: 
India, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Brazil. 
 
WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REPORTS (WCR ) 1992 
Clean: 
Singapore, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Canada, United Kingdom, Australia. 
Partly Corrupt: 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, Austria, United States, Hong Kong, Japan, France, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Hungary, Taiwan, Portugal, Malaysia, Turkey, Spain, 
Greece, Mexico. 
Corrupt: 
Thailand, Italy, India, Brazil, Indonesia. 
 
WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REPORT (WCR) 1994 
Clean: 
New Zealand, Denmark, Singapore, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Ireland, Australia, 
Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
Partly Corrupt: 
Netherlands, Germany, United States, Austria, France, Hong Kong, Portugal, 
Malaysia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Japan, Spain, Mexico, Taiwan, Greece, Turkey. 
Corrupt: 
Hungary, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Italy, Brazil. 
 
WORLD COMPETITIVENESS REPORT (WCR) 1996 
Clean: 
Denmark, Singapore, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Australia, Ireland, Canada, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Netherlands. 
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Partly Corrupt:  
Switzerland, Luxembourg, United States, Germany, Austria, Hong Kong, Japan, 
France, Belgium, Portugal, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hungary, Spain, Turkey, Italy. 
Corrupt: 
Greece, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Mexico. 
 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL  1995 
Clean: 
New Zealand, Denmark, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, Canada, Australia, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, United Kingdom, Germany. 
Partly Corrupt: 
Chile, United States, Austria, Hong Kong, France, Belgium, Japan, South Africa, 
Portugal, Malaysia, Argentina, Taiwan, Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Greece, Colombia, 
Mexico. 
Corrupt: 
Italy, Thailand, India, Philippines, Brazil, Venezuela, Pakistan, China, Indonesia. 
 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL  1996 
Clean: 
New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Australia, Ireland, United Kingdom, Germany. 
Partly Corrupt: 
United States, Austria, Japan, Hong Kong, Belgium, Chile, France, Portugal, South 
Africa, Malaysia, Greece, Taiwan, Hungary, Spain. 
Corrupt: 
Brazil, Colombia, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Venezuela, China, Pakistan. 
 
TRANSPARENCNY INTERNATIONAL 1997 
Clean: 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Australia, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Ireland, Germany, United Kingdom. 
 
Partly Corrupt: 
United States, Austria, Hong Kong, Portugal, France, Japan, Chile, Spain, Greece, 
Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Africa, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, 
Philippines. 
Corrupt: 
China, Argentina, Venezuela, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Colombia. 
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TRANSPARENCNY INTERNATIONAL 1998 
Clean: 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland, Australia, United Kingdom, Ireland. 
Partly Corrupt: 
Germany, Hong Kong, United States, Austria, Chile, France, Portugal, Spain, Japan, 
Belgium, Malaysia, Taiwan, South Africa, Hungary, Greece, Italy, Brazil, China, 
Turkey, Mexico, Philippines, Argentina, Thailand. 
Corrupt: 
India, Pakistan, Venezuela, Colombia, Indonesia. 
 
APPENDIX B 
SOURCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The data on measures of regulations and bureaucratic competition are taken from the 
World Bank (1996). Data on government consumption, and urbanisation are taken 
from World Development Indicators (1998) for 1996. Data on newspaper circulation 
are taken from the World Development Report (WDR) for 1994; Data on total years 
of schooling are taken from Barro and Lee (1993, 1996) for the period of 1990.  The 
political liberty index is taken from Gastil (1996). 
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 Comments 
 
It was a great pleasure for me to read the paper by Mr Naved Ahmad because 
it is very rare that you come across such a clean and such a simply stated hypothesis 
and the follow-through that was there statistically. So I was very excited to see this 
and the main reason is not so much because of the methodology or the statistical 
procedures, the differences between the questions or the different scales that were 
used to measure corruption indices. Of course that technical side of thing had it been 
represented in the documents one could have gone into but since it was not in there.  
The most important thing that this was saying when you look at the number of 
countries which have moved on the indices that are shown in one of the tables on 
page 6. You can see the countries which have been able to move from either being 
highly corrupt, to less corrupt, or from less corrupt to clean, and the other way 
around from being highly corrupt from being clean to less corrupt or from being less 
corrupt to totally corrupt. And I think, the amazing  result that you can see from this 
is that there are very very few countries over a long period of years that have been 
able to move upward on the index,  who have been able to move from a corrupt style 
of government. According to these indices to another level. – cleanliness and I think, 
that will speak volumes when it is juxtaposed to what the development literature in 
its emphasis of the development has been from the end of the colonial era till today. 
Because many of the developing countries were parts of colonial empires, the 
inheritance of the governance structures was quite solid when these countries 
achieved independence mostly after World War-II and soon after that. And I think 
that the important thing is that, soon after the independence was achieved the era of 
aid sort of took over and it was all of the growth models about how we can create 
bigger savings to have bigger investments and than get out of this low level, what 
Rostow called the low level liquidity trap, and thereby when we make a bigger pie 
the trickle down effect will take over and you have all of this external and internal 
balance economics and all of these things coming up. And that was basically what 
was concentrated on. And you had the green revolution technologies being 
introduced and how to shift revenues from agricultural productivity into 
industrialisation and urbanisation type activities and so on and so forth.  It’s not until 
very very recently  that the underlying problems with the governance institutions like 
e.g. accounts, or the judiciary, or management of audit system,  or for example, 
efficiency in discipline rules, or other kinds of regulatory frameworks that actually 
run governance structures even in service oriented type of organisations like railways 
or airlines etc. That the spot-light  has really come to be shown on them only very 
recently. So I think,  that in one-way  what this data really is saying is that we have 
also arrived at a time in history, of the development literature as a whole governance 
is coming into centre stage.  In the past this is some thing that was taken for granted 
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that you would have justice, that you would have good policing, that you would have 
functional tax machinery, so on so forth. That is changing. I think to me that was a 
very important thing that stuck me. The other thing just to wind up quickly because I 
know, we are the short of time is. I think, it goes its stretches beyond really the 
mandate of, what it is trying to do in term of the very clear and clean almost clinical 
analysis that it gives of the comparison between these different indices when it starts 
making some assumptions, when it gets into the regression analysis against the 
independent variable in the end of the paper, e.g., it says, it can be intuitively argued 
that large governments creates large bureaucracy which in turn provide more 
opportunity for graft. That is a very loaded statement, does this mean that you can’t 
have small highly corrupt government or that a large government can be relatively 
less corrupt even though the incidences of corruption or more so. It is difficult to 
judge from that or to ascertain to statistically what really is being targeted and 
similarly in the same section it was very difficult to understand what was meant by 
from the winner’s side or from the loser’s side. I think, that definition wasn’t unclear 
to me at least on as to what that meant. In some of the other assumptions again it 
says that the urban associations were able to control corruption because a stronger 
voice more organisational skills perhaps better financing, and it use that to say that 
the urban areas will tend to have less corruptions in government that also not 
necessarily true. We know e.g.,  in Pakistan’s case that it’s very difficult to make a 
broad statement. In urban areas, the land mafia and the corruption in the land 
management department is huge compared to the rural areas.  The burning down of 
the record-rooms just in Pakistan alone in order to sort of deter scrutiny on land 
ownership has taken place in the city like Lahore. So, it’s not entirely clear that 
follows either or what those level of association are that will actually tend to make 
less or more corruption. I think in that part really the also in term of democracy the 
paper states that where there is democracy there will be more decentralise decision-
making better voice and therefore less corruption. I think, may be the past four or 
five democracies in Pakistan were dismissed because of corruptions. So that also 
doesn’t follow you can have very corrupt democracy, it’s not necessarily true that 
democracy introduces is more clean government,  if you will. So,  in this way I think,  
some of these assumptions were bit over-stated or stretch. But other than that, I think 
that in the beginning part. This is the first work of its kind that I have seen of its 
kind. And its very interesting to bring into ambit of some accountability round what 
is taken as global statistical knowledge. Some time it is not knowledge it is just here 
say put in to numbers. And this really attempts to shine light on that which I think, 
was excellent.  
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